◆ SpookStack

2,000' when approximately 15 miles off the target--by which time they would have been well past the Essex. It would appear reasonable to assume that the carrier's intercept should have been made at approximately 100 miles, or 25 minutes' warning time of the incoming aircraft. 12/ Equally difficult to understand is Admiral Clark's statement that by the time his jets were launched and to the target area the B-26s had made their strikes and departed. As already noted, based on the take-off times out of Puerto Cabezas as many as tive B-26s--those flown by Ray, Shamburger, Shannon, Goodwin, and) I-could have been in the air at the time that the jets from the Essex arrived. Herrera and, possibly "Doug" in the first two B-26s over the target area might have been in and out prior to the arrival of the CAP; but according to Buck Persons, Doug was intercepted by one of the USN jets as he was en route back to Puerto Cabezas. Even though he had no radio contact with the Navy pilot, Doug was able to direct the aircraft back toward the beach where Joe Shannon still faced possible attack by the T-33s which had downed his wing man. 13/ This would seem to justify some questions about the credibility of Clark's testimony before ~he Taylor Committee. Stanley Beerli also criticized the failure of the Navy radar to pick up the B-26s, and, in addition, he ~ught that if the Navy had been serious about its obligation to support 287 J