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appear to have been another of the numerous, significant questions which went unasked by the Taylor Comrnittee.* There also were other problems with reference to the CAP from the Essex that were indicative of consinerably less than top performance by the USN. Teegen, as reportedly previously, had urged the Navy aircraft to operate at lower altitudes if they were to be of any use for protecting the brigade aircraft. 19/ Based on Captain Krisel's claims that in his di~cussions with sorne of the Essex's pilots who flew the CAP he was told that they had no orders to fire, it would have made no difference. at what height the A4Ds operated. .£Q./** * In his di~cussions with Col. Beerli, Capt. Krisel apparently did not indicate that there was any radar pickup of the B-26s. 16/ In one of his conversations with me, Krisel stated that the A4D Skyhawks from the Essex did not carry radar and had to be vectored by the carrier to any aircraft which they could not sight visually. 17/ Yet another version of the time frame problem was told to Peter Wyden in a conversation with Admiral Clark's second in com- mand, "Deacon" Fickenscher. According to Wyden: On Wednesday \119 April 1961J at 6: 30 a.m., Deacon lFickenscherJ received a message ..• from Washington •.• to launch four SkYhawks which were supposed to protect B-26s headed for the beach .••. The launch was sched- uled for six-thirty, clearly no longer possible. The planes were airborne shortly before seven-thirty. Deacon knew they would almost certainly miss their rendezvous ..•• Nobody could execute orders before they were received. Obviously, communications with Washington were not working right. 18/ **The writer told Krisel that this was an unbelievable story be.cause the purpose of the CAP was to "defend CEF against air attacks from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat, but defend CEF forces from air attack." Krisel reported that the pilots claimed that the Rules of Engagement must have been changed and the pilots were unaware of the change. 289