◆ SpookStack

In the continuing discussion of the intelligence available to the anti-Castro forces, it also was stated that the estimate of the weaknesses of Castro's navy had been borne out by the failure of that unit to play any significant role during the period of the invasion. The committee was told, however, that the tactical intelligence on Castro's ground forces had been poor, a principal reason being that Castro's militia had no standard organization which could be used as a measure to determine strengths, equipment, and so on. Again with reference to' the infantry units, excuses were made for the apparent willingness of Castro's forces to stand up to what had been claimed would be far superior fire power. The caveat being th.at if foreigners, possibly Czechs, were directing the Cubans that might have accounted for their combat effectiveness. As in the first meeting of the Committee, the question was raised about commands being issued in European tongues. There was no 38/ truth in this rumor of East European leadership.-- The discussion of the success of Castro's forces in turning aside. the invasion led to another of the topics which would be of continuing interest to the Cuban Study Group--the plan, or lack of planning, for internal support from the Cuban populace for the invasion. Discussion of this sUbject by the Agency's representatives at the fourth CSG meeting suggests a far higher d~gree of naivete than one should have expected.* with reference * Cabell and Bissell were listed as present and, as noted above, King and Dulles probably were present for at least part of the session. 50