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to the question of the validity of intelligence concerning dissident groups and potental supporters for the invaders, the Agency's respondents seemed to place more faith in the clandestine reports being received from Cuba than ever was warranted by the information available from common sense review of the National Intelligence Estimates which had been available both prior to and subsequent to the departure of Batista and the takeover by Castro--reports which the senior planners of the project claimed to have used and obviously did use at least when they changed the plan from infiltration of GW cadres to invasion in the fall of 1960. There was also an attempt to avoid giving any firm answer to the question of how many Cubans were expected to join with the invasion ;forces. On the one hand, the statement was made that the number likely to support the invasion had been reduced from somewhere be.twe.en 20,000 - 30,000 down to 2,500 - 3, 000; but in the next breath it was stated: One of the factors that made us think that the resistance potential within Cuba was substantial was the fact that we had a back- log of 19 requests from our agents for supplies, a~ms, and ammunition for 8,000 people. These people were crying for supplies. Had we been able to provide this equipment, these people would have had something to rise with. 39/ As would be pointed out in subsequent meetings of the committee, this euphoric point of view was hardly in keeping with. the lack 51