◆ SpookStack

15 March 1961 had been prepared for the Secretary and clearly stated the JCS preference for the Trinidad plan over any of the alternative plans that had been presented, McNamara none-theless testified as follows: The JCS had reviewed the plan in early JanuarY1 and while they considered it marginal, they still believed it had sufficient chance of success to warrant i.ts implementation. After all the modifications to the original plan were made they still believed the chances of success were marginal, but they still wanted to give it a try. There was one important modification that the Chiefs never knew about and one about which they all felt strongly. This was a decision to cancel some of the D-Day air strikes. This decision was made at the only meet- ing at which neither I nor the Chiefs participated. It was my understanding that both the CIA and Chiefs preferred Zapata to Trinidad. For while Trinidad offered the advantage of close proximity to Escambray or guerrilla territory, Zapata offered an air strip and was likely to be less well protected by Castro, thereby raising the chances of success for the initial landing. 79/* This response by Secretary McNamara raises a number of questions. Did he even read JCSM-166-6l? If so, he completely ignored the Chiefs~ strong pre.ference for Trinidad. If the Chiefs felt very strongly about the cancellation of the D-Day targets, *. There was no question of cancellingsomeof the D-Day air strikes-- the D-Day air strike was cancelled. McNamara appears to have used the word "strikes" when he meant "targets," and there were numerous revisions in the list of targets for the D-Day strike prior to the time that the President cancelled the strike. The question of defense of either the Trinidad or the Zapata air strip was never an issue. One source has indicated that in response to Chester Bowles's question, "Will this Iinvasion plan] work without American troops?" that McNamara's response was, "It would be very doubtful. "80/ I 84 ..• ",' ,~,