◆ SpookStack

completely understood Castro's air capability. Based on overhead photography of the clearest possible nature, every single combat aircraft that Castro possessed--up to, and including, a number of decoy aircraft--was positively identified. Post-invasion phot~graphy fully supported the pre-strike estimates--photography which, in fact, was available even before Secretary McNamara appeared before the committee. In further refutation of McNamara, to suggest that the limited number of aircraft that Castro was able to put up would not have been further reduced (even to 100 percent down) by the D-Day strike ignores the marginal condition that actually existed with Castro's Air Force at the time. Also illustrative of the essentiality of complete domination of the air over Cuba was a statement which. appeared in another JCS memorandum that had been prepared for Mr. McNamara--which again he apparently ignored. JCSM-146-6l of 10 March 1961 forwarded the report of the JCS team which had conducted "an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. This report indicated that a successful lodgment as planned for Trinidad--the di.scussion of Zapata had not yet taken place but would follow very soon after--could be anticipated~ but "ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of the anti- g; Castro elements throughout Cuba." In reaching that conclusion, 86 , 'J" ,.,/ -,I;