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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 ARMS AID...Continued tion plans, one for the Persian Gulf and one for stationing medium-range nuclear cruise missiles in Europe. But the Pentagon under Reagan has done more than Carter planned at the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and in Oman, Moroc- co, Iceland, Japan, Horiduras, Tur- key and elsewhere. e The Army late last year won permission to create a new “light” division, designed for quick deploy- ment to Third World hot spots. The Marines, the original Third World intervention force, have been strengthened and modernized. And the expansion of the Navy, partic- ularly the reactivation of four World War II battleships that would be of little use in a major conflict with the Soviet Union, is intended to increase USS. “power projection” beyond US. bases. The Navy's enthusiastic em- brace of the cruise missile program under the Reagan administration similarly will expand the military's reach into relatively undefended countries. The Navy intends to buy more than 4,000 of the long-range. slow-flying cruise missiles at more than $3 million each by 1992, includ. ing 3,200 in a non-nuclear versior: that would be of little use against the Soviet Union. The missiles will “permit a limit- ed, measured response as an expres: sion of U.S. will and determination without jeopardizing aircraft or pi- lots,” Rear Adm. Stephen J. Hostet- tler, director of the joint cruise mis- siles project, testified recently in Congress. eThe administration has rein- forced its buildup with action: send- ing AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft) to Africa to respond to crises in Chad and Sudan, shooting down Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sidra, stationing Marines in Lebanon, rotating thousands of troops through Honduras, invading Grenada. During the first three years of Reagan’s term, the number of troops overseas increased by about 5 per- cent—from about 475,000 to almost 500,000. e The administration has favored covert action in Third World coun- tries, unsuccessfully seeking to re- peal congressional restrictions on USS. support for Angolan rebels and successfully seeking to finance Ni- caraguan insurgents bent on over- throwing that country’s leftist San- dinista government. - “The administration has tried to reduce the asymmetry, the extent to which the Soviet Union can use all means—terrorist, covert, arms ship- ments, what have you—to topple governments or support govern- ments that are opposed by the peo- ple—while the Unied States would be left with a choice between vacat- ing the field, abandoning the friends of democracy, or getting into an all- out conflict,” Ikle said. He was referring to covert war, but his comment also could be ap- plied to the most dramatic aspect of the administration’s preparations for the Third World: the revitalization of the Green Berets and other spe- cial forces that went into a decline after Vietnam. Koch, principal dep- uty assistant secretary for interna- tional security affairs, has been charged with strengthening the spe- cial forces to combat what he sees a8 Soviet-inspired insurgencies. “I think Kennedy properly recog- nized that we were confronted with this kind of problem all over the world,” he said recently. “Then the thing slid into what became Vietnam and sort of went to hell in a hand- basket, but it doesn’t follow that the essential motive was faulty or the rationale behind it was faulty.” In the two years ending next Oct. 1, the number of special operating forces in the Army will have grown by almost 50 percent, from a little more than 4,000 to almost 6,000, according to Army officials. The Army is adding a third Ranger com- mando battalion this year and a new Green Beret unit with a forward-de- ployed battalion in Okinawa, similar to those already stationed in Pana- ma and West Germany. The Navy formed a new team of commandos, known as Seals, and now is modernizing the Seals’ equip- ment and buying them “special war- fare infiltration craft,” Koch said recently. The Air Force agreed to buy 12 new MC130 Combat Talon airplanes, which can fly low at night and drop troops and equipment with pinpoint accuracy. It was then told by Weinberger to buy nine more. The potential use of these special forces is not limited to guerrilla wars. The forces also are trained to defeat terrorists and to infiltrate enemy lines in conventional wars, blowing up radio stations, organizing fifth- column resistance groups and sab- otaging command centers. But they are being touted above all for their usefulness in fighting guerrilla wars and in teaching armies in Central America and elsewhere how to defeat guerrilla movements. “If we send in the 82nd Airborne or the Marines, we have taken over the war,” Ahmann said. “In low-level conflicts, whether that will be really effective is questionable .... You need to help the indigenous forces do the job better and win the pop- ulation over, and for that you need guys trained to think about the three guys or seven guys creeping around at night trying to kill each other.” Koch has urged Congress, the public and skeptics within the Pen- tagon to support more special forces. He frequently cites Soviet “Spet- snaz” special forces to make his case. “The threat posed by these forces— including the threat to the continen- tal United States—is real, grave and itoo slowly being recognized,” he tes- ‘tified in Congress recently. j In response to prodding from the top, the Army in 1982 formed the "4st Special Operations Command to coordinate its special forces activi- "ties. The Air Force followed suit ‘with its 23rd Air Force last year. ‘Then, at the beginning of 1984, the oint Chiefs created the Joint Spe- icial Operations Agency to coordinate special forces activities and, re- portedly, to manage the top-secret commando unit that draws people ‘from all four services. Despite the new structure, many generals would prefer to plan for larger, World War Il-style conflicts “which tend to be cleaner,” Ahmann said. Koch has complained in testi- ‘mony that the services are stingy with promotions for special-forces operators. “It's a small constituency, and the conventional military is somewhat suspicious of it, in many cases for very good cause,” Koch said in a re- CONTINUED NEXT PAGE Xpproved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-ROP96-00788R000100330001-5