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110. Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum, “Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba,”’ 29 November 1962 No. 11173/62 29 Novenber 1962 CENTRAL INTBLLIGENCS AGENCY MEMORANDUM: Deploynent and Withdrawal of Soviet Wis- siles and Cther Significant Weapons in Cuba NCTE the number of Soviét missiles deployed to and subse- quently withdrawn from Cuba, the chances that Soviet missiles remain in Cuba, and the situation and outlook with respect to rates of withdrawal of IL-28s and other significant Soviet weapons in Cuba. CONCLUSION The Soviet claim to have delivered only 42 nis-~ Siles to Cuba, and to have now withdrawn these, is consistent with our evidence. We cannot exclude the possibility that more::actually arrived, and that some therefore remain, but we think that any such number would be small. Available evidence also warrants the conclusion that the Soviets are preparing to withdraw the IL-28s. . i. The Soviets almost certainly intended to deploy substantially more than the 42 missiles which they acknowledged and have withdrawn. We reach this conclusion from the following factors: a. Nine sites with four launchers each have been identified in Cuba. The Soviets normally provide two missiles for every HRBN and IRBM launcher and, since several of the launchers already had two, we believe that they intended to provide two each for the others, or 2 total of 72 for the 36 launchers identified.: Of these, 48 would be HR3Ns, of which we identified 33, and the remainder would-be 123Ms, of which we have no evidence that any had reached Cuba. by 22 Cetober. b. The pattern of the nine identified sites strongly suggests that at least one more was planned to form a pair with the ninth. In addition, there is sore evidence suggesting that the Soviets planned a third de- ployment area, in eastern Cuba, to follow upon those in This memorandum assesses our evidence concerning | i 1 J i the western and central parts of the country. 357