◆ SpookStack

110. (Continued: cannot rule out a sonewhat higher nunber, primarily because Of the possibility that two or rore of the seven other voyages delivered nissiles. The analy- sis of these thirteen voyages in Annex B inclines us to accept a figure not much higher than the 36 we can account for. 4. Sources inside Cuba have provided numerous reports in recent weeks claining that strategic nis- siles have been retained in Cuba and concealed fron aerial reconnaissance. Most of these sources are i untested, and some of their reports are manifestly erroneous. -Checks by other methods, including photo- if t | | i | | i | | graphic intelligence, have failed to produce clear confirmation of any of these reports, but we are not able to disprove some of them.* Specifically, at Ma- yari Arriba~-about 40 miles northwest of Guantanamo-- we have identified both from photography and ground sources a Soviet installation which may be missile- associated. We have not, however, identified any equipment which can’ be associated with strategic mis- siles. 5. Since the foregoing evidence is not fully conclusive, we must also consider whether the Soviets would wish to secrete strategic missiles in Cuba. It is doubtful, in our view, that they would do so for strictly military reasons. In the first place, our shipping analysis leaves little room for a number of remaining missiles large enough to be strategically significant at some later date. Such missiles could . not participate in an all-out Soviet surprise attack without great risk that preparations would be detected by the US and the entire strategic plan compromised. Neither could the Soviets count on being able to use them in a retaliatory second strike. 6. In contemplating concealment, the Soviets would be aware of great risk. They would foresee that, if the US found out, a second Cuban crisis would ensue which would be unlikely to leave the Castro regime in- tact. Such a renewed crisis would find the Soviets in an even more disadvantageous position than before to protect their interests or avoid humiliation, ¥4 Summary review Of these reports, including the iden-— tification of certain areas which remain suspicious, is presented in Annex C. 359