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112. McCone, Memorandum for the President, 28 February 1963, and “Conclusions” (attached: 28 February 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR: The President The White House Iam returning the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Acvisory Board dated February 4th commenting on the intelligence community's actions in connection with the Cuban crisis. I will not attempt to comment on the specifica of the report. It igs my under- standing that the Board will make recommendations to you for cor- rective measures which they feel should be taken within the intelligence community. When these recommendations are received, I would hope for an opportunity to comment upon them as I did on the recommendations contained in their interim report of December 28th. When I appeared before the Board on November 7th, December 9th, and December 28th, I stated that there was an understandable reluctance or timidity in programming U-2 overflights over Cuba after we had discovered the presence of surface-to-air missile installations. This caution was understandable not only because of the extremely severe criticism of "U-Z2 incidents" dating back to the Powers’ incident on May 1, 1960, but also because of the more recent loss of a Chinat Ue2 and a U-2 intrusion over Sakhalin in early September. This . same attitude apparently dictated the Secretary of State's action in revising a ClA-proposed flight at the Special Group meeting held in Mr. Bundy's office on September 10th. It was, I believe, the same attitude that caused the Special Group in considering my request on October 4th for extensive Cuban reconnaissance to aski@escr JCS, and CIA to study all alternative means of conducting aerial recon- naissance and to report back on October 9h. In retrospect, it might be contended that there was a failure to exercize sufficient urgency in proposing U-2 reconnaissance missions; however, I am inclined to believe that any one reaching such a conclusion must first care- fully weigh the sericus considerations that enter into a decision to overfly denied territory. I further advised the Board that I felt the analysts, both in the intelligence community and elaewhere in Government, including the erwwmemen prema mye ryan cae as rr a oe ae 373