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112. (Continued} State Department, were so convinced that the Soviets would not accept the inevitable confrontation resulting from placement of offensive missiles in Cuba, that they were inclined to diamiss such evidence as there was to the contrary. This, I find, is one of the difficulties of dealing with the imponderables of what the other fellow will or will not do. With particular reference to the Cuban situation, it should be noted that for two years the intelligence community had been surfeited with reports of ''missiles in Cuba, " all of which proved to be incorrect prior to those which we received on or about September 20th. Nevertheless, one can now readily conclude that greater emphasis should have been placed by the estimators on certain of the "Intelligence Indicators" attached as Annex A to the Board report. About 3,500 agent and refugee reports were analyzed in the preparation of my report to the Killian Board and of this number, only eight in retrospect were considered as reasonably valid indicators of the deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba. 1 continue to feel that the intelligence community performed well. I have examined this performance personally and in depth, and incidentally with a critical eye. Aa you know, my own views differed from those of the community, I belleve that the con- clusions reached from my study made for the Board at your request reflect a more reasonable judgment of the performance of the intelligence community in the six months' period prior to the October crisis. A copy of these conclusions ia attached, John A, McCone Director Attachment JAM:mfb:ibd (28 Feb 63) Orig - Addressee 1 ~ DCI White House 1 - DCI Chrono 1-1G 1-WE