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9 11 Commission Report — Part 3
Page 69
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With the récent directives implementing the intelligence agent career track and the administrative
reforms related to building an intelligence workforce, we have in place the essential structural
elements of an intelligence-driven counterterrorism operation. The challenge now is to refine and
continue ta develop that operation — an effort that will require additional resources, continued
attention by FBI leadership, and constant training of FBI personnel in intelligence processes and
objectives.
While we have clearly made substantial progress over the past 31 months, itis difficult to come
up with an exact.measurement of the.current effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts. Besides
citing the absence of successful attacks on the homeland since September 11, 2001, there is no
single measure that completely captures the progress we have made. There are several yardsticks,
however, that demonstrate the effectiveness of the core functions of a Counterterrorism Program.
These yardsticks include the following:
« Development of human assets
* Number of FISAs
Number of intelligence reports generated
€
Quality of daily briefings
Effectiveness of counterterrorism operations
Continued protection of civil libertias
An application of these yardsticks demonstrates. the progress we nave achieved since September
11, 2001.
Development of Human Assets
The FBI has long recognized that human source information is one of the most important
ways fo investigate criminal activity. We have iong-standing expertise in recruiting and using
human sources, and we have used those skills to great effect across a wide range of investigative
Programs, including organized crime, drugs, public corruption, and white coliar crime
While we also have developed sources over the years in the Counterterrorism Program,
the September 11, 2001, attacks highlighted the shortage of human intelligence reporting about
al-Qa'ida both in the U.S. and abroad. With the U.S. government having relatively few assets who
were able to penetrate and report on al-Qa'ida's plans, we were vulnerable to surprise attack,
The Bureau has placed a priority on developing human intelligence sources reporting on
nternational terrorists. We have revised our training program, our personnel evaluation criteria,
and our operational priorities to focus on source development. While we continue to grow this
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