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9 11 Commission Report — Part 3
Page 71
71 / 81
Prior to. September 11, 2001, the FBI produced very few raw intelligence reports In FY
2003, we produced and disseminated 2,425 Intelligence Information Reports containing raw
intelligence derived from FBI investigations and intelligence collection The majority contained
intelligence related to international terrorism, the next greatest number contained foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence information; and the remainder concerned criminal activities and cyber
crime These llRs were disseminated to a wide customer set in FBI field offices, the Intellhgence
Community, Defense Community, other federal law enforcement agencies, and U.S. policy entities
In addition to these individual reports, the FB! developed and issued in January 2003. a
classified comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to the U.S. This assessment focuses
on the threats that the FBi sees developing over the next two years, based on an analysis of
information regarding the motivations, objectives, methods, and capabilities of existing terrorist
groups and the potential for the emergence of new terrorist groups and threats. throughout the
world. This threat assessment is used as a guide in the allocation of investigative resources, as
a useful compilation of threat information for investigators and intelligence personnel within and
without the FBI, and as a resource for decision-makers elsewhere in the government. A 2004
threat assessment is scheduled to be released in April 2004
We are preparing to produce, in the near future, the FB! Daily Report and the FBI National
Report to provide daily intelligence briefings to personnel in the field and external customers. One
will be praduced at the classified level and limited in distribution to upper-level field managers.
The other will be unclassified and widely distributed to field office personne! and our partners in
the law enforcement community
A good example of our ability to exploit evidence for its intelligence value and share that
intelligence is our use of the al-Qa'ida terrorism handbook. A terrorism handbook seized from an
al-Qa'ida location overseas in the mid-1990's was declassified and released by DOJ shortly after
the events of September 11, 2001. We determined that intelligence gleaned from the handbook
could provide useful guidance about al-Qa‘ida’s interests and capabilities. Accordingly, we produced
and disseminated a serles of intelligence products to share this intelligence with our personnel
in the field and with our law enforcement partners. Nine Intelligence Bulletins were based in whole
or in part on this intelligence. In addition, we used information derived from the al-Qa’ida Handbook
to update our counterterronsm training, including the Intelligence Analyst Basic Course at the
College of Analytical Studies, the Introduction to Counterterrorism Course at the National Academy,
and sessions on Terrorism Indicators and Officer Safety in our SLATT training The unclassified
version of the handbook is now maintained as a reference in the FBI Library and is accessible to
all the students at the Academy. It also ts included in the reference manual CD-Rom distributed
as part of SLATT training.
Quality of Daily Counterterrorism Briefings
One telling measure of our improved counterterrorism operations is the development of
our capability to brief the daily terrorist threat information. The development of this capability
reflects the maturing of our centralized Counterterrorism Program.
Prior to September 11, 2004, the FBI lacked the capacity to provide a comprehensive daily
terrorism briefing — to assemble the current threat information, to determine what Steps were being
taken to address each threat, and to present a clear picture of each threat and the Bureau's
response to that threat to the Director, senior managers, the Attorney General, and to others in
the Administration who make operational and policy decisions. With a decentralized program in
which investigations were run by individual field offices, the Bureau never had to develop this
specialized skill. With the need for centralized management after September 11, 2001, however,
it became an imperative.
MISC DOC. #5 65 000000404
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