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2. ifthe starting point for the FBI's intelligence related activities remains a case, presumably opened due to some inimical activity, how is the FBI being proactive in preventing the next catastrophic terrorist attack? Response: The Starting Pou for FBI intelligence activities ws the intelligence requirement, aot the “case " Intelligence requirements directly reflect national security promtics and serve as predication for the opening of cases designed te prevent | acts of harm to the nation. In the FBI, the “case" 1s the velucle for organizing invesiigative work Because the starting pomt for the FBI intelligence program } an inteligence requirement, we ensure that FBI cases are opened to develop the infonnation we must obtain to prevent not unly lerrorist activities, hut.also host ufeligence operations, cyber attacks, and crimunal activitres that would harm our nations. 3. Prior to the creation of the Office of Intelligence in late 2001, could you explain how the intelligence cycle worked within the FBI? For example, how would 2 tasking for domestic intelligenes collection from another member of the U.S. Intelligence Community be communicated acrass the FBI, and then a respanse back to requesting party? Response: MISC. REQ. #53 In fate ZO01, an Ol was created in CTD. This represented Stage One of the FBI's efforts to develop an enterprise-wide intelugence program, and focused largely on aligning intelligence production efforts with national priorihes and developing Standards for analyst tramung and performance. Stage Two of our efforts focused on creating a robust analytic capability in CTD with the help of 25 analysts detailed to the FBS from the CIA. Stage Three of our efforts was the creation of an FBI-wide intelligence program to ensure uniform iuoplementation of the intelligence cycle across ai] investigative programs. Prior to the creation of the O1 in early 2003, the FBI's intelligence cvele was implemented in each of the mvestigative programs, Requests from other agencies went directly to those investigative programs, often faciiytated by haison officers at each organization’s respecave headquarters. Except where taskme was associated with a specific operational lead to one sr more field offices, there was no mechanusm to ensure a respanse was provided to the requesting party Simuarly, there was no single center responsible for ensue that other mierested parties knew or had access to the responses. Mast importantly, the requests for information rately crossed investigative programs and, as a consequence, the full breadth of FBI collection assets was not mobilized im response to the request. 000004688