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* FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95) . 6 " : @ ; & 315B-HQ-1448534 Continuation of FD-302 of ___.Ali Hasan Al-Majid i. ,0n04/09/2004__,Page__ 8 Special Ammunition Committee to study the issue..." (The copy-of. this document was obtained from the US. Army Criminal Investigative Division.) ; Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, in general, he did not know what took place between the Minister of Defense and military intelligence. According to Al-Majid, military intelligence reports directly to the President and only informs the Minister of Defense. He added that neither "special" nor regular ammunition was the . responsibility of military intelligence. Al-Majid stated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Any order to use chemical weapons would have come from Saddam Hussein or the Army Chief of Staff. Al-Majid believes such weapons would have been used only against Iran if, and only if, Iraq was in "a difficult situation." He stated that he does not believé it is the ; responsibility of military intelligencé to search for saboteurs an direct strikes against them. By 1988, Al-Majid asserted that the saboteurs. had "reached the end" and the use of chemical weapons was not necessary. Control of the villages in northern Iraq did not require chemical weapons and the Anfal Operation did not require chemical weapons. Al-Majid suspects that this. document is a forgery, but can not say for certain. . Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number M5/Sh3/Q2/9879, dated May 18, 1988, and an attached, report from the Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence, to the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector. The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is our special report. about the. Northern Region for the. month of April, 1988. Please be informed." On page four, paragraph c, the attached report states, "After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were,’ their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) ‘among the inhabitants. of thosé villages as well as neighboring villages." Paragraph (3) of the same page states, "The intensity of the artillery bombardments by our forces and.the use of (the special ammunition) led to heavy losses among them." _ (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report _ dated February, 1994. It appears on pages’ 57-61 of the report.) Al-Majid denied knowledge of thits document or the events described in it. As used in this: report, he reiterated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Al-Majid doubts the Pa