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a7 - : * FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95) a q ‘315B-HO-1448534 . Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid ,0n 04/09/2004 __,Page ‘. just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen days." The copy of this audiotape was. obtained by the interviewer from previously described. Per FBI LS a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this b6 recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the . pre Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters'in ~ the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context _appears to be 1987. The copy of this audiotape obtained gromfon though appearing to be from the same meeting, was provided to the PBI as a Separate . recording.) Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated, that this is the same meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987 discussed in a previous interview. : Al- -Majid commented that these statements are attempts: at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the northern region. His words were used as a scare tactic, similar to what was previously described in this interview and would later be used in Dohuk. In Al-Majid's opinion, the saboteurs would. be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened: by their forced separation from the cities. The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the medning of the sentences "I will not let the government. get involved. I will say it is from here [the Northern Bureau] . Al-Majid stated he was simply projecting the power of the Northern Bureau and that he had not exceeded his authority. The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the statement "ZI told the expert comrades that I need guerrilla groups in Europe to kill whomever they see from them [the saboteurs]. Al-Majid admitted to making this statement but asserted that it was. simply part of the “psychological operations" against the saboteurs. He added that he had neither knowledgé of nor authority over Iraqi government operations or opératives in Europe. However, Al-Majid believed that such a statenient would become known to Talabani and would possibly diminish the strength of the saboteurs.