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a EE SA TEE ALO “A we ee ee stitutions; the organs of democratic society, in- vigorated rather than depressed by the war, had not yet been enfeebled by official secrecy, repres- sion, suspicion, craven conformism, or the cor- ruptions of absolute power, shielded from public criticism. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the strategy of mass extermination, which did not bear public discussion or open assessment, was rapidly taking shape. For a brief moment, nevertheless, our leaders scized the political initiative, though they were handicapped by ambivalent intentions and con- tradictory goals. Our contribution to organizing the United Nations, though it had been originally proposed by the United States, was as cagey and inept as Russia’s, for the frustrating Council veto was an American conception. Under a more imaginative leadership two other, admirable American proposals came forward, UNRRA and the Marshall Plan. Both these agencies had great potentialities, for at first we had the intelligence to offer their benefits even to Communist coun- tries. ° Had we followed these efforts through, they might have permanently increased the whole range of international cooperation. In wiser exec- utive hands, these initiatives would not have been prematurely terminated. Rather, they would have been employed to reduce world tensions and to win general assent to a program for giving all nations the prefatory exercises in magnanimity and understanding essential to the re-establish- ment of moral order and the control of our de- moralizing weapons. But even in their brief, limited application these agencies did far more to fortify the assisted nations against oppressive Com- munist dictatorship than all the billions we poured into NATO and SEATO to build up futile ar- maments for wars neither we nor our allies ' were capable of fighting. Witness our long series of backdowns and letdowns: Czechoslovakia, Korea, Victnam, Poland, East Germany, Hun- gary, Egypt. I. our commitment to the strategy of extermi- nation, under a decision made when General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, the United States rejected the timely warnings of the world’s lead- ing scientists and the common counsels of human-