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| tov ate THE ROLE OF CHINA 35 of Chinese Communist territory in northwest China. Practical working relations between Vietnamese and Chinese Communists, however, did not develop until after the Chmese Communists took over the mainland of China in 1949. In 1950 the People’s Repub- lic of China along with the Soviet Union granted official recog- ition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Although Chinese support for Ho Chi Minh’s forces in the war against the French was limited at first, after the end of the Korean War captured American arms and other aid were sent to Vietnam in significant amounts. After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the Chinese, and also the Soviet Union, continued to provide North Vietnam with technical and material assistance in substantial quantities. During the early years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the North Vietnamese Communists endeavored to assume a neutral position, clearly hoping to avoid being too closely tied to either party. Beginning in May 1963, after American activities in South Viet- ham were expanded and intensified, the North Vietnamese, while maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union, commenced to give more consistent support to the Chinese position. So far the Chinese have apparently taken no initiative in seeking any negotiations on Vietnam and have insisted that peace can come only through an American return to the Geneva Agrzement and acceptance of the four-point basis for peace laid down by the North Vietnamese. The Chinese have also stated that Chinese volunteers would be available if requested, and recent press reports indicate that Chinese technicians and laborers are playing an in- creasing role in helping the Vietnamese repair damage caused by American bombing. Though the Chinese are clearly anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, any American invasion of North Vietnam itself would: almost certainly bring them openly into the war. Thus the course of recent events in Vietnam has served to make China a more imminent threat to the security and independence of Southeast Asia than it has been before, and indeed than our earlier analysis suggests it need be. We see little evidence that (hina je likali ta vata cle wee oe peti AD ae eat TE A ean MiHitd Is GIRW LY OU Ed a Upult a pulley OE Conquest HW AMerCAn Military forces are withdrawn. China's efforts to influence its Neighbors through traditional instruments of cultural penetration 8 afl _