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; —— sna -itinathitinidhtenalc ttn iii Doniiniidinietiis satan HISTORY GF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM | A3 not forget that it was the Vietminh regime, now ensconced in tke North, that drove out the French; and many landless peasants remembered that it was the Vietminh that had divided up the estates of absentee landlords for their benefit. By helping to establish a separate state south of the armistice line, the United States was clearly acting m defiance of the Geneva Accords. In effect, both the United States and Saigon accepted, and insisted that Hanoi accept, only those aspects of the Geneva ; Agreements that they found advantageous and repudiated those ¢ . provisions that they regarded as contrary to their interests. Thus, with American encouragement, Diem announced in mid-1955 that the elections promised at Geneva would not be held. Until 1958 the Hanoi government persisted in its efforts to arrange for the promised elections, but Diem, consist- ently backed by the United States, refused. During at least the first three years of the post-Geneva period, there was a lull in the military struggle, Hanoj refrained from support of insurrectionary activity in the South. But by repudiating the heart of the Geneva Agreements, Diem made civil war inevitable. When, in a civil war, a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the political level, the side which repudiates the agreed conditions must expect that the military struggle will be resumed. Although American support was given to Diem, the United States did not make a blank-check commitment to whatever regime happened to hold power in Saigon. What has been referred to as “the U.S. commitment” was a limited, qualified pledge of economic support, and it was made specifically to Diem’s govern- ment. It was not in any sense a pledge of military support. The cornerstone of our Vietnam involvement, President Eisenhower's letter to Diem in October 1954, was simply an undertaking “to * ‘ examine” with Diem “how an intelligent prozram of American aid given directly to your government can assist Vietnam .. . in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resist- ro~. * fae . an Ing attempted subversion or aggression through military means. me 7 A critica! liffcatian at even fe econqmir aid was te ex se40(C« AA oritical qualification was that cven this economic aid was to be \ ~ { subject to Dicm’s carrying through reforms responsive to the vente mtitepe Te