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a een ee & } 44 i PEACE IN VIETNAM aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Thus, in concluding his letter, President Eisenhower wrote: The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam tm under- taking needed reforms, It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an indc- pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong government, Such a govern- ment would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. This is the substance of the Eisenhower commitment to which the present administration often refers when it is invoking Amer- ican honor. . Except for Eisenhower's letter, the only other undertaking which the Administration cites as a proof of a Vietnam commitment is the treaty of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. But this treaty involves no American pledge to the South Vietnamese gov- ermment, which was not and could not be a signatory. With tespect to the area of South Vietnam, and also that of Cambodia and Laos, SEATO provides that in cases of aggression by armed attack, each SEATO power is “to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes,” and in cases of sub- version, to “consult” with the several SEATO signatories “in order to agree on the measures to be taken for common defense.” SEATO, then, was not and is not a pledge to the government of South Vietnam. The treaty merely provides that each member country should determine whether its own security interests require it to respond to developments in that area and, when this hap- pens, to consult with other signatories on any defense measure to be taken. The United States has certainly never been able to bring its SEATO allies to agree that the treaty’s vague language could possibly be translated as any kind of commitment to the govern- ment of South Vietnam. President Kennedy’s view of the United States commitment is best summed up in the statement he made in September 1963, when he said: “In the fina! analysis, it’s their war. They're the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help