◆ SpookStack

storage facilities, and (4) license or lease of fissionable materials for peaceful use. When Mr. Bernard Baruch, the American representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, presented the American plan in June 1946, he added provisions for (a) swift punishment for illegal production and (b) elirnina- tion of the veto in the Security Council when considering counter-measures against nations engaging in illegal production. The Soviet counter-proposal, elaborated gradually over the course of a year, asked for the outlawing and destruction of the bombs first, prescribed limits on inspection, permitted day- to-day inspection without the vero, buc kepe the veto intact for Security Council action against violators. By September 1946 the Scientific and Technical subcommittee concluded thar (a) effective control of production of atomic energy is tech- nologically feasible, (b) processes leading to both peaceful and warlike use of atomic energy are so similar that both require control, and (¢) production of U-235, plutonium and U-233 must be stricely controlled. This report was adopted unani- mously (including the Sovier Union}. A second subcornmittee was set up to consider safeguards, Its preliminary report approved inspection of mining and refin- ing stages but preferred placing actual management of plants producing nuclear fuels in the hands of the international con- trol agency. The Soviet Union raised some objection, bur it will never be kttown whether she would have agreed co the reporc, for the work of the Commission was shifted to che job of preparing a general report which was finally forced through substantially in the American form. The promise of these earlier developments has unfortu- nately been overshadowed by the stalemate in both the atomic and the conventional disarmament commissions. However, in the debates before the commissions some cautious modificarions of positions previously taken were ventured, Breaking the Stalemate After years of deadlock between the great powers, disarmament negotia- tions took on new life at che Sixth Gencral Assembly meeting of the United Nations in Paris during the fall and winter of 1951-1952. A Committee of Twelve, appointed by the pre- 12 vious General Assembly, completed a report recommending merger of the two commussions, which for several years had worked separately on atomic and conventional arms cantrol and reduction. Anticipating this report, the American, British and French governments introduced a new set of proposals shortly after che Sixth General Assembly convened on Novem- ber 8, 1951. Unfortunately the new proposals were at first stated and discussed in an atmosphere inflamed by bitterness, causing widespread anxiety lest the entire session come to naughit. However, spokesmen for bath contesting blocs subsequently moderated words and temperatures sufhciently to permit more reasoned consderation of the issucs involved, In the days and weeks that followed, Russian delegates countered with pro- posals of their own, and both American and Soviet blocs made what appeared to be significanr clarifications and concessions. Some promise of more reasoned negotiation thus appeared. When the General Assembly adjourned in February 1952, che long-standing stalemate began to xive way to.a more fluid situation which permitted some hope for further progress. The bare outhne of these events illustrates that, even in spite of tensions and bitterness, negotiation of sharp differences can still be carried on. Indeed, readers may be surprised to note below thar the areas of agreement are as great as they are. Merging the Commissions The First General Assembly (on January 24, 1946) voted to establish the Atomic Energy Commission. A year later (on February 13, 1947) the Security Council, on che basis of an Assembly resolution, established the Commission for Conven- tional Armaments. Boch commissions, especially the former, did valuable exploratory work. But for about three years prior to the meeting of the Sixch General Assembly in Paris, the commissions had been hopelessly deadlocked. One of the controversies was whether discussions of atomic and conventional armaments should be kept separate. Erom the beginning American spokesmen, though admitting chat both types of weapons should be broughe under concrol, in- sisted on separating’ the discussions. Atomic weapons, they maintained, presented new and peculiar technical problems ° : 13