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upon a flat reduction, within one year, of a suggested one-third of all conventional arms and armed forces. To a war-weary, armament-burdened world this is a highly attractive proposal. Tf both blocs were equally strong in all weapons and arrned forces, a one-third reduction would not change the ratio. However, western spokesmen claim that the Soviet Union pos- sesses a superiority in conventional arms and armed forces and that, if both sides now disarmed by one-third and if the atom bomb were banished entirely, the West would be seriously weakened and the unbalance would invite aggression, Soviet spokesmen deny this alleged superiority in conventional arms and assert, therefore, that a one-third reduction would affect all parties equally. As a counter-proposal western spokesmen urge progressive and balanced reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, in such a way as to keep power in equilibrium at a reduced level of armament. Soviet spokesmen claim this would only delay disarmament, prolong tension and threat of war, invire endless haggling over criterta and quotas, and in face lead to an in- crease of armament in some nacions. At the moment, no sign in Establishing the Control Orgdn All parties agree that the proposed disarmament treaties should escablish one or more international control organs “within the framework of the Security Council.” The organization and powers of the control organ and its relation- ship to United Nations agencies would be prescribed and defined in the prospective treaties. Staff personnel would be international and responsible directly to the control organiza- tion. The control ergan would establish its own rules and decide day-to-day questions by majority vote. Morcover, all parties agree that che control organ should be permitted to carry on atomic research, though there is Jack of agreement on the kind and scope of such research, (Soviet spokesmen desire that national laboratories be permitted to carry on atomic research concurrently with the laboratories under the interna- tional control organ. Arnerican spokesmen préfer that national 16 . research be licensed by the control organ which would have exclusive power to engage in research involving “dangerous” facilities or macters relating to military application.) All agree thac the control organ should maintain strict international control, but a difference of opinion exists as ta the best methods of doing so. Ownership and Management Even when atomic weapons of Atomic Facilities are banned, uranium mines, atomic plants and Izbora- tories, reactors, stockpiles of fissionable materials and lke re- sources would remain in existence, and provision must be made to deal with them. Ie is agreed that permissible facilities of this nature would be used only for peaceful purposes, but measures must be taken to preyent their diversion to forbidden uses. As already pointed out, the American plan would estab- lish an international atomic development authority with power to hold, manage, license and otherwise control che world’s “dangerous” atomic facilities, materials and stockpiles, What is “dangerous” and “non-dangerous” has been fairly well de- fined. The former includes stockpiles of uraniurn, reactors, and facilities fas the aradnerign af T2922 Wl2te and alu weeks AER Aad PA a Oy LO pie tonium. Items like the following would probably be classified as non-dangerous—ore mines, refineries, radioactive materials for use in scientific, medical and technological studies, and small quantities of fissionable material for experimental uses. Asa principle rather than a concrete pact of any formally pro- posed and elaborated plan, the United States recommended the dispersal of facilities and stockpiles around the world in a “strategic balance,” so that if any were seized by one national government, other national governments would have more facilities for atomic production than the treaty violatur. The proposed authority would also establish production quocas, operate laboratories, discover and verify relevant daca, and conduct inspections continuously. Fer this “plan” (which is far from complete in several crucial details} much has been claimed. As manager of atomic facilities, the international authority would be more likely to keep abreast of technological developments. As proprietor of rhe facilities, the authority could operate with less friction and dan- 17