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AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) Murtha, its intended object. Moreover, under the circumstances presented here, no jury could find anything truly “threatening” in Fenton’s remarks because they could not influence Murtha’s attitude or behavior in any way when spoken only to Leventry. The government cites a number of cases in which threats were not made directly to the speakers’ intended victims, yet convictions were upheld. Careful review, however, reveals those cases to be inapposite. In United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997), defendant threatened an FBI agent by leaving him a voicemail message, which the agent heard and “found chilling and scary.” Id. at 1490. Other cases are in the same vein. In Orozco- Santillan, defendant threatened an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer over the telephone; once again, the agent heard the threat and was frightened. 903 F.2d at 1264. Likewise, in United States v. Stevenson, 126 F.3d 662 (Sth Cir. 1997), defendant wrote a threatening letter to his probation officer, which “frightened and alarmed” her when she received it. Id. at 663. And in Kosma, defendant wrote a series of threatening letters to President Reagan. 951 F.2d at 550. These letters, while never seen by the President, no doubt caused considerable consternation to the officers responsible for his protection. 951 F.2d at 554. As the court noted, moreover, they were directed “at the exact person whom Section 871 was designed to protect.” Id. at 555. The government relies principally, however, on United States v. Snelenberger, 24 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that there need be no intent that defendant’s statements be communicated to their target. There, the defendant told two mental health workers of his plans to kill an administrative law judge and was prosecuted under § 115. Id. at 801. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Id. at 803-04. In that case, however, defendant argued 1]