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AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) only that his mens rea was insufficient to support conviction, and the court never passed on the issue of whether the actus reus was proven. See id. at 803. Thus, while this case is relevant to an analysis of Fenton’s intent, it has no precedential value on whether he made a true threat.’ Accordingly, I conclude that Fenton’s statements did not constitute true threats under § 115(a)(1)(B). For this reason alone, his motion for judgment of acquittal must be granted. In the interest of completeness, however, I will also address Fenton’s argument that he did not, as a matter of law, possess the requisite intent to support his conviction. IV. Assuming arguendo that the evidence did support a finding that Fenton made a true threat to Murtha, it still must be determined whether he had the intent that § 115(a)(1)(B) requires: [i] with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official. . . while engaged in the performance of official duties, or [ii] with intent to retaliate against such official . . . on account of the performance of official duties I will address these two alternate forms of intent in turn. A. For the reasons set forth supra in my discussion of actus reus and the Alkhabaz case, it cannot seriously be concluded that Fenton had any intent to impede, intimidate or interfere with Likewise, in United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970), defendant stated to a co-worker his intention to kill President Nixon. Id. at 294-95. The court held that this statement amounted to a true threat, id. at 295, but significantly, defendant’s defense was limited to a general denial of making the remark. Id. at 295-96. Thus, again, the court was never called on to decide the circumstances under which statements made to unrelated third parties constitute threats. Indeed, the government does not cite this case in its actus reus argument, but saves it for its discussion of Fenton’s mental state. 12