Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
National Security Letters — Part 1
Page 402
402 / 1188
AJL your statements will be made a part of the record in their entirely. And we will
have a five-minute time for each of you.
CONYERS:
And we ask Inspector General Glenn A. Fine to begin our testimony.
Welcome to the committee.
FINE:
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith and members of the Committee on the Judiciary,
thank you for inviting me to testify about two reports issued by the Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General, regarding the FBI's use of national security letters and its
use of Section 215 orders to obtain business records.
The Patriot Reauthorization Act required DOIG to examine the FBI's use of these
authorities. And on March 9th, we issued reports detailing our findings.
Today I will summarize the key findings from our reviews, focusing my comments on
the national security letter report.
Under five statutory provisions, the FBI can use national security letters -- NSLs -- to
obtain, without review by a court, records such as customer information from telephone
companies, Internet service providers, financial institutions and consumer credit
companies.
Although most of the statutory provisions regarding NSLs existed prior to the
enactment of the Patriot Act, the act significantly broadened the FBI's authority to use
NSLs in two primary ways.
First, it eliminated the requirement that the information sought must pertain to a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and substituted the standard that the
information requested must be relevant to or sought for an investigation to protect against
terrorism or espionage.
Second, the Patriot Act significantly expanded approval authority for NSLs beyond a
limited number of FBI headquarters officials to the heads of all FBI field officers.
Our review examined the FBI's use of NSLs from 2003 through 2005. The OIG will
conduct another review, examining the FBI's use of NSLs in 2006, which we are required
to issue by the end of this year.
In sum, our review found widespread and serious misuse of the FBI's national security
letter authorities.
in many instances, the FBI's misuse violated NSL statutes, attorney general guidelines,
or the FBI's own internal policies.
FINE:
We also found that the FBI did not provide adequate guidance, adequate controls or
adequate training on the use of these sensitive authorities.
Before describing the main findings of our report, however, I believe it is important to
provide context for these findings.
First, we recognize the significant challenges the FBI was facing during the period
covered by our review. After the September | 1th terrorist attacks, the FBI implemented
Reveal the original PDF page, then click a word to highlight the OCR text.
Community corrections
No user corrections yet.
Comments
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.
Continue Exploring
Agency Collection
Explore This Archive Cluster
Broad Topic Hub
Topic Hub
letter
bureau
Related subtopics
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic