◆ SpookStack

We visited four FBI field offices and reviewed a sample of 77 investigalive case files and 293 NSLs. We found 22 possible violations that had not been identified or reported by the FBI. We have no reason to believe that the number of violations we identified in the field offices was skewed or disproportionate to the number of violations in other files. This suggests that the large number of NSL-related violations throughout the FBI have not been identified or reported by FBI personnel. {n one of the most troubling findings, we determined that the FBI improperly obtained telephone toll billing records and subscriber information from three telephone companies pursuant to over 700 so- called exigent letters. These letters generally were signed by personnel in the Communications Analysis Unit, the CAU, a unit of the Counterterrorism Division in FB] headquarters. The exigent letters were based on a form letter used by the FBI's New York Field Division in the criminal investigations related to the September I lth attacks. FINE: Our review found that the FBI sometimes used these exigent letters in non-emergency circumstances. In addition, the FBI failed to ensure that there were authorized investigations to which the requests could be tied. The exigent letters also inaccurately represented thai the FBI had already requested subpoenas for the information when in fact it had not. The FBI also failed to ensure that NSLs were issued promptly to telephone companies after the exigent letters were sent. Rather, in many instances, after obtaining records from the telephone companies, the FBI issued national security letters months after the fact to cover the information obtained. We concluded that the FBI's use of these exigent letters inappropriately circumvented the requirements of the NSL statute and violated attorney general guidelines and FBI policies. In response to our report, we believe that the department and the FBI are taking our findings seriously. The FBI concurred with all our recommendations and the department's National Security Division will be actively engaged in oversight of the FBI's use of NSLs. In addition, the FBI's Inspection Division has initiated audits of a sample of NSLs issued by each of its 56 field offices. The FBI is also conducting a special investigation on the use of exigent letters to determine how and why the problems occurred. The OIG will continue to review the FBI's use of national security letters. In addition to issuing a second report on the use of NSLs in 2006, we intend to monitor the actions that the FBI and the department are taking to address the problems we found in that review. Finally, | want to note that the FBI and the department cooperated fully with our reviews, agreed to declassify information in the report, and appear to be committed to addressing the problems we identified.