◆ SpookStack

OGC has been working with the affected unit to attempt (o reconcile the documentation and to ensure that any telephone record that we have in an FBI database was obtained because it was relevant to an authorized investigation and that appropriate legal process has now been provided. If we are unable to determine the investigation to which a number relates, they will be removed from our database, and the records will be destroyed. The 1.G. rightfully objected to the FBI obtaining telephone records with a letter that stated that a federal grand jury subpoena had been requested when that was untrue. It's unclear why that happened. The director has ordered a special inspection in order to better understand the full scope of internal control failures and to make sure that in fact every record obtained pursuant to a so-called exigent letter has been appropriately connected to a national securily investigation. That review will also determine whether the practice discussed by the 1G. existed anywhere other than in the headquarters unit identified in the report. In response to the obvious mternal control lapses this situation highlights, changes have already been made to ensure that this situation does not recur. Any agent who needs to obtain ECP A- protected records on an emergency basis must do so pursuant to 18 USC Section 2702. 2702 permits a carrier to provide information regarding its customers to the government if the provider believes in good faith that there is a life-or-death-type emergency that requires disclosure of the record. By FBI policy, a request for disclosure pursuant to that provision generally must be in writing and must clearly state that the disclosure without legal process 1s at the provider's option. The emergency must also be documented to our files so that the use of the letter can be audited, The policy allows for oral requests, but any oral requests have to be approved and documented to the file. CAPRONI: The I.G. also examined misuse of NSLs that had been reported and some that had not as part of the IOB process. As this committee knows, pursuant to executive order, the president has an Intelligence Oversight Board that receives from the intelligence community reports of intelligence activities that the agency believes may have been unlawful or contrary to execulive order or presidential directive. The I.G. found that trom 2003 to 2005 the FBI had self-reported 26 potential violations involving NSL authorities. The LG. also found, however, a number of potential IOBs in the files it examined that had not been reported to OGC for adjudication. Although press accounts of this report have implied that the IG. found massive abuses of the NSL authorities, a careful read of the report does not bear out the headlines. The 1.G. examined 293 NSLs; a reasonably smali, nonrandom sample. We do not suggest that the sample was not a fair sample, but only point out that it's questionable from a statistical standpoint to attempt to extrapolate from a very small sample to an entire population.