◆ SpookStack

Of the 293 NSLs the LG. examined, 22 were judged to have a potential nreported violation associated with them. Of that 7 percent, 10, or almost 50 percent of that group, were third-party errors; that is, the NSL recipient provided the FBI with information that we did not seek. CAPRONI: Only 12 of the NSLs examined, or 4 percent of the total group, had mistakes that the LG. rightfully attributes to the FBI Examining the 12 potential errors that were attributable to the FBI reveals a continuum of seriousness relative to the potential impact on individual rights. Four of them, or just over | percent of the sample, were unquestionably serious violations. Specifically, two of the violations involved obtaining full credit reports in counterintelligence investigations, which is not statutorily authorized. One involved issuing a national security letter when the authorization for the investigation to which it related had lapsed. And one involved issuing an NSL for information that was arguably content, and therefore not avatlable pursuant to NSL. The remaining eight potential errors involved lack of attention to detail, and did not involve the FBI seeking or obtaining any information to which it was not entitled. We do not excuse lack of attention to detail. And I have admonished the lawyers in the field who review NSLs that they must be careful so that they can avoid this sort of error. But we do believe that such mistakes pose different challenges and risks, in seeking information to which you are not entitled. In short, approximately | percent of the NSLs examined by the LG. had significant etrors that were attributable to FBI actions and that had not been, but should have been, reported as potential IOB violations. A | percent error rate is not acceptable, and we have taken steps to reduce it, Those steps are discussed at length in my written testimony, and I will not repeat them here. But among the steps I do want to mention is the director's order to special inspection of all field officers’ use of national security letters, an inspection that began on Friday. We offered to fully brief the committee on the results of that inspection when It Is complete. Several of the actions we are taking involve changes to FBI rules and policy. Rules will, of course, only eliminate errors if they are followed. The LG.'s report has painfully demonstrated for us that, while establishing policy -- that while we are good at establishing policy and setting miles, we are not as good as we must be at establishing internal controls and auditing functions to make sure that the rules are followed. CAPRONI: The full parameters of an FBl-compliant program have not been set, and the inspection that is currently under way will clearly influence the parameters of the program. In short order, however, the FBI will establish a vigorous multidisciplinary compliance program that assures as well as any compliance program can that our employees faithfully adhere to all of rules and policies, particularly those that are designed to protect privacy and civil liberties.