◆ SpookStack

1631-HQ-1462938 predicted effect will be a (miracle) in these conditions unless a large, concentrated dose is received, and that it evaporates slowly in snow covered areas. 4. We are capable of using the Air Force, tube launchers, and helicopters at night. 5S. We suggest the following: a. The postponement of the strike against the Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the AL- BARZANI Group until next June. We prefer selected target locations outside the range of the Iraq-Turkey boundary line. We have selected targets that are located away from the probable effect of the forces along the Turkish border or Turkish villages. b. Start off with similar plans to execute limited operations toward the Iranian agents! bases. 6. Please review and inform us of the assignment... with respect, Walid On March 19, 1987, in Presidential Memo Number 7/G2/877/K, HUSSEIN approved the DMI’s suggestions. [attached as document #xXxX] On March 25, 1987, the DMI concluded its study as directed by HUSSEIN and reported its finding in report Number S3/Q2/6885 titled, "Use of Special Ammunition" which SABIR Signed. The report identified the locations of the Iranian agents' bases, and selected targets according to enemy size and their effect on the internal security in the Northern Region. The Report listed suitable and available capabilities of the "special ammunition" and the launching means. (attached as document #XX) The report identified Iranian agents' bases in the region of Balisan Basin (Balisan villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan) located near the main road between Chuwa’r Qurna- Khalifan, and the region of Qaradagh Basin (Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan) "as important to both Iranian agents and enemy personnel. Their size effected the internal security to the Northern Region and were far enough from Iraqi forces, making them more suitable than other targets, for ‘special ammunition’." Because limited amounts of "special ammunition" were available to the Iraqis at the time, SABIR described the following options: