◆ SpookStack

1631-HQ-1462938 > Directing a strike to the selected targets during this period by using two thirds of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Sarin agent). In addition, one third of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Mustard agent), and keeping the rest for emergency situations in the operating sector. > Postpone strike until mid-April 1987, until there is enough “special ammunition" available, after improvements will be made in the production. AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of the above correspondence sent from the DMI to the Presidential Secretary's Office. AL-HUMMADI recognized it as a copy of the authentic document in format and substance and would have given it to Huessin in the normal course of his duties. On March 29, 1987, AL-HUMMADT authored the Presidential Office's response to SABIR's DMI correspondence which is numbered Presidential Memo 953/965/K. This memorandum relayed HUSSEIN's approval for the chemical weapons strike and emphasized that his approval was conditioned upon “exploiting the results of the strike as the purpose is not to simply hurt the sabatours.” HUSSEIN directed SABIR and the DMI to coordinate with the intended Corps and inform the Presidential office before initiating the strike. [attached as document #XX] AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's March 29, 1987 memorandum. AL-HUMMADI stated that it was an accurate copy of the authentic document in format and substance, and verified his signature. AL-HUMMADI explained that HUSSEIN himself did not correspond directly with his officers and advisors; rather, pursuant to normal communication protocol, the Presidential Secretary's Office issued all of HUSSEIN's communications and orders. Hence, AL-HUMMADI communicating HUSSEIN's orders to the intended recipients. Based upon his daily contact with HUSSEIN, it was clear to AL-HUMMADI that HUSSEIN was, in this series of communications, approving and authorizing SABIR and the DMI to begin chemical weapon strikes near Turkey. On March 31, 1987, SABIR advised the Army Chief of Staff in Memorandum 7371 that HUSSEIN had ordered a study of the use of "special ammunition," and made the same suggestions he had made for HUSSEIN. SABIR, who signed the report, also detailed