◆ SpookStack

8 Texas et al. ve. The United States et al. spection by the stockholders of such corporations, books,’’ in which shall be recorded the amount of capital stock subscribed, the names of stockholders, etc., and transfers, the amount of its assets and liabilities, and the names and places of residence of its officers. See, also, Art. 4115, Texas Revised Statutes, 1879; Laws of Texas, 1885, ¢, 68; Arts. 1358, 6281, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925. Counsel for the United States and for the Interstate Commerce Commission urge that the ‘‘Office-Shops Act’’, here involved, was ' acted independently of the above statutes. Laws of Texas, 1889, 106; Art. 6275, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925. Accord- ingly, they insist that the order of the Commission and the lease in question apply to the ‘‘general offices’, shops, ete., and not to the ‘‘public office’’ of the domestic corporation. Counsel for the applicant, the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, submits that the lease by necessary implication requires the Texarkana & Daet Geeith Datleae Camnany ¢n maintain ite neinainal offieo in fort Smita nal Way SULLEpPOaL yy LAF MERGER RAE A) PL AE ree WR ak Texas as the Texas statute requires. See as to service of process, Art. 2029, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, In view of the disclaimer on behalf of the United States and the Interstate Com- merce Commission, and the interpretation placed upon the pro- vision in the lease, we assume that the question before us merely relates to the abandonment or removal of ‘‘ general offices’’, shops, eic., as distinguished from the ‘public office’’ required by the Texas statutes, that is, to those transportation facilities the con- - nued maintenance of which, in the circumstances described by 2 findings of the Commission, would entail unnecessary and bur- densome expenditures in operation. As thus construed, we find no ground for coneluding that the approval of the provision in the lease was beyond the Commission’s authority. There is no inter- ference with the supervision of the State over the lessor in matters essentially of state concern, ag distinguished from the operations which in their effect upon interstate commerce are of national The State invokes Section 11 of Title I of the Emergency Rail- road Transportation Act, 1933, which provides that ‘‘ Nothing in this title shall be construed to relieve any carrier from any con- tractual obligation which it may have assumed, prior to the enaet- ment of this Act, with regard to the location or maintenance of Texas ei al. v8. The United Biates et al. $ offices, shops, or roundhouses at any point’’, But that section refers explicitly to what is contained in Title I of the Act, with respect to ‘‘emergency powers’’, dealing with the authority of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and kindred matters, and does not by its terms apply to the provisions of Title IT of the Act, in which are found the amendments of Section 5 of the Inter- state Commerce Act with respect to the approval and authoriza- tion by the Interstate Commerce Commission of consolidations, purchases and leases. And Section 11 of Title I relates to ‘‘con- tractual obligations’ assumed by the carrier and does not aptly refer to obligations imposed by statute. The insertion of the pro- vision in Title I, with its restricted application, and the omission of a’similar provision from Title II, indicate an intentional dis- tinction, Title IY of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, in amending Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, carries its own provision as to immunity from state requirements which would stand in the way of the exeeution of the policy of the Con- gress through the Commission’s orders. Subdivision (15) of Sec- tion 5 es amended reads.) Ton amended, reads: ‘The carriers and any corporation affected by any order under the foregoing provisions of this section shall be, and they are hereby, relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws as desig- nated in section 1 of the Act entitied ‘An Act to supplement, exist- ing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes’, approved October 15, 1914, and of ali other restraints or prohibitions by or imposed under authority of law, State or Federal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to’ do any- thing authorized or required by such order’’. The view that, by reference to the context, this immunity should be regarded as limited to those ‘‘restraints or prohibitions by or imposed under authority of law’’ which fall within the general description of ‘‘anti-trust’’ legislation, is too narrow. The rule of “‘ejusdem generis’? is applied as an aid in ascertaining the in- tention of the legislature, not to subvert it when ascertained. Mid-Northern Oi Company v. Montana, 268 U. 8. 45, 49. The scope of the immunity must be measured by the purpose which iSee Cong. Rec., 73d Cong., tat sess., Vol. 77, Pt. 5, p. 4439. 5Compare subdivision (8) of Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Transportation Act, 1920.