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4 Fairport, Pawnesuille & Eastern R. R. Co. vs. Meredith. the installation and use of power brakes required by §§ i and 3 so obviously contribute to the safety of the traveler at crossings that it is hardly probable that Congress could have contemplated their inapplicability to that situation. Section 9, supra, provides that when a train is operated with power or train brakes, not less than 50 per cent. (under regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission now 85 per cent.) of the in such train shall have their brakes used and operated by Cars Wi SuCO Tail SGau cave weir oF ope the engineer of the locomotive drawing the train. That a train so equipped and operated can be brought to a stop much more quickly han by the use of hand brakes is, of course, perfectly clear; and it is reasonable to conclude that a result so readily perceivable lies within the purview of the requirement. The most important pur- pose of a brake upon any vehicle is to enable its operator to check its speed or stop it more quickly than would otherwise be possible. The old railway hand brake was principally for that purpose, but it was undesirable for two reasons—first, because in setting it the brakeman was exposed to danger, and second, and especially in the case of long heavy trains, it did not meet the necessity of stopping the train quickly in emergencies. In this second aspect, the commen law duty of the railway company to use ordinary care to provide and keep in reasonably safe condition adequate brakes for the control of its trains was one owing, among others, to travelers in the situation which the respondent here occupied. Sections 1 and 9 of the Safety Appliance Act converts this qualified dnty imposed by the common law into an absolute duty, from the jolation of which there arises a liability for an injury resulting therefrom to any person falling within the terms and intent of the act. Compare Loutsville & Nashville R. BR. Co. v. Layton, supra, 620; St, Lows & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. 8. 281, 295, To confine the beneficial effect of these provisions to employes and passengers would be to impute to Congress an intention to ignore the equaily important element which their enactment actually con- tributes to the safety of travelers at highway crossings. Since all of these three classes of persons are within the mischief at which the provisions are aimed, it is quite reasonable to interpret the statute imposing the duty as inelnding all of them. It fairly may be said that the nature of the duty tmposed by a statute and the benefits resulting from its performance usually determine what persons are entitled to invoke its protection. In Fatrport, Painesville & Eastern B. R. Co. vs. Meredith. 5 Aichison, T. & 8. F. RK. Co. v. Reesman, 60 Fed. 370, where the railroad company failed to erect and maintain sufficient fences, as required by a state statute, in consequence of which an animal got upon the track and derailed the train, it was held that an employe upon the train who was injured was entitled to recover under the statute. In the opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer (pp. 373-374), it is said: ‘ie At any rate it ie eloor that the fant that aaetoin alaecse nf mn Bb MA 2 2 Oe LEE EE AL BA 2 Giasses or per sons were intended to be primarily protected by the discharge of a a statutory duty will not necessarily prevent others, neither named nor intended as primary beneficiaries, from maintaining an action to recover for injuries caused by the violation of such legislative command. It may well be said that, though primarily intended fot ‘the benefit of one class, it was also intended for the protection of all who need such protection. . . . The purpose of fence laws, of this character, is not solely the protection of proprietors of adjoining fields, It is also to secure safety to trains. That there should be no obstruction on the track is a matter of the ut- most importance to those who are called upon to ride on railroad trains. Whether that obstruction be a log Placed by some Wrong- doer, oY an animal sir aying on the track, the danger io ihe trains, and those who are traveling thereon, is the same, To prevent such obstruction being one of the purposes of the statute, any one whose business cails him to be on a train has a right to complain of the company, if it fails to comply with this statutery duty.” See also Hayes v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 111 U. 8. 228, 239- 240, and other authorities cited in the Reesman case. In the hght of what has now been said, it follows that the duty Imposed upon petitioner by the provisions of the act in respect of power controlled brakes extends to and includes travelers at rail- way-highway crossings. Second. The holding of the court below as to the doctrine of the last clear chance is challenged as being contrary to the weight of American authority; but we are precluded from considering the contention because it does not present a federal question. The federal Safety Appliance Act, as we already have said and this court repeatedly has ruled, imposes absolute duties upon inter- 38ee, for example, Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelyon, 173 Fed. 915; St. Louis & 8. FL RB. Co. v. Summers, 173 Fed. 358; Smith v. Railroad, 114 N. C. 728, 734-735; Hays v. Railway, 70 Texas 602, 607. Contra: Thompson vy. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 292.