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fbi-use-of-global-postioning-system-gps-tracking — Part 01
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to the property searched). We therefore join the district court and the parties in referring
to the Jeep as being Jones's. 451 F.Supp.2d 71, 87 (2006)
A. Was Use of GPS a Search?.
For his part, Jones argues the use of the GPS device violated his "reasonable
concurring), and was therefore a search subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. Of course, the Government agrees the Katz test applies here, but it
argues we need not consider whether Jones's expectation of privacy was reasonable
because that question was answered in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), in
which the Supreme Court held the use of a beeper device to aid in tracking a suspect to
his drug lab was not a search. As explained below, we hold Knotts does not govern this
case and the police action was a search because it defeated Jones's reasonable expectation
of privacy. We then turn to the Government's claim our holding necessarily implicates
prolonged visual surveillance.
1. Knotts is not controlling.
*8 The Government argues this case falls squarely within the holding in Knotts that
"[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
that case the police had planted a beeper in a five-gallon container of chemicals before it.
was purchased by one of Knotts's co-conspirators; monitoring the progress of the car
carrying the beeper, the police followed the container as it was driven from the "place of.
purchase, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, to [Knotts's] secluded cabin near Shell Lake,
Wisconsin,' 460 U.S. at 277, a trip of about 100 miles. Because the co-conspirator, by
driving on public roads, "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look"' his
progress and route, he could not reasonably expect privacy in *the fact of his final
destination." Id. at 281..
The Court explicitly distinguished between the limited information discovered by use
of the beeper-movements during a discrete journey-and more comprehensive or sustained.
monitoring of the sort at issue in this case. Id. at 283 (noting "limited use which the
government made of the signals from this particular beeper'); see also id. at 284-85
("nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after
it had indicated that the [container] had ended its automotive journey at rest on
respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin'). Most important for the present case, the
Court specifically reserved the question whether a warrant would be required in a case
involving "twenty-four hour surveillance," stating
if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually
occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.
10
TTUOTD
007094
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