◆ SpookStack

to sanction 'twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.' " (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284). *9 Two circuits, relying upon Knotts, have held the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor an individual's movements in his vchicle over a prolonged period is not a search. United States y. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.2010); United States y. Garcia. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir.2007), but in neither case did the appellant argue that Knotts by its terms does not control whether prolonged surveillance is a search, as Jones argues here.. 06-2741) ("Garcia does not contend that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle while equipped with the GPS tracking device as it made its way through public thoroughfares. Knotts. His challenge rests solely with whether the warrantless installation of the GPS device, in and of itself, violates the Fourth Amendment."). Thus prompted, the Seventh Circuit read Knotts as blessing all "tracking of a vehicle on public streets' and addressed only "whether installing the device in the vehicle converted the subsequent tracking into a search." Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. The court viewed use of a GPS device as being more akin to hypothetical practices it assumed are not searches, such as tracking a car "by means of cameras mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging," than it is to practices the Supreme Court has held are searches, such as attaching a listening device to a person's phone. Id. at 997. For that reason it held installation of the GPS device was not a search. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit perceived no distinction between short- and long-term surveillance; it noted the appellant had. "acknowledged" Knotts controlled the case and addressed.only whether Kyllo y. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), in which the Court held the use of a thermal imaging device to detect the temperature inside a home defeats the occupant's reasonable expectation of privacy, had "heavily modified the Fourth Amendment analysis." Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. In a third related case the Eighth Circuit held the use of a GPS device to track.a truck used by a drug trafficking operation was not a search. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (2010). After holding the appellant had no standing to challenge the use of the GPS device, the court went on to state in the alternative: Even if Acosta had standing, we would find no error.... [W]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when. while the vehicle is parked in a public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time. Id. at 609-10. In each of these three cases the court expressly reserved the issue it seems to have thought the Supreme Court had reserved in Knotts, to wit, whether "wholesale" or "mass" electronic surveillance of many individuals requires a warrant. Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610: Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 n.2: Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. As we have explained, in Knotts the Court actually reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance. That issue is squarely presented in this case. Here the police used the GPS device not to track Jones's "movements from one place to another," Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, but rather to track 12 TTU/OTD 007093