◆ SpookStack

Declassified Document Archive & Reader
Log In Register
Reader Ad Slot
Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.

ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962

354 pages · May 15, 2026 · Broad topic: War & Geopolitics · Topic: Cuban Missile Crisis · 354 pages OCR'd
← Back to feed
47. (Continued) — SET e. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through a third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet missile bases; i. We should try to create maximum confusion and not ‘worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring to infiltration and sabotage efforts; @- We should review our policy on a provisional govera- ment and try to get all the various factions working together. In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World although in doing so we must aot isolate ourselves. 3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make a quick surprise attack and knock out these bases or to lay on a heavy propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal. Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not seem firm in any of his proposals but appeared to have been boxing the compass as to courses of action. 4, Mr, McNamara pointed out that if we are going to take overt military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before any of the missiles become operational. General Taylor pointed out that the elernent of surprise would be essential but since this would then be a one-shot operation, wa should establish an immediate blockade and then look toward invasion although this latter prospect did not enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba, 5, The Prosident pointed out that the missiles certainly had to be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at — -SEGRER-
OCR quality for this page
Community corrections
First editor: none yet Last editor: none yet
No user corrections yet.
Comments
Document-wide discussion. Follow the Community Standards.
No comments on this document yet.
Bottom Reader Ad Slot
Bottom Reader Ad Slot placeholder
If you would like to support SpookStack without paying out of pocket, please consider allowing advertising cookies. It helps cover hosting costs and keeps the archive free to browse. You can change this choice at any time.

Continue Exploring

Use the strongest next step for this document: continue reading, jump to the topic hub, or move into the matching agency collection.
Continue Reading at Page 149
Jump straight to page 149 of 354.
Reader
Cuban Missile Crisis Topic Hub
See the topic overview, related documents, and linked subtopics.
Hub

Explore This Archive Cluster

This document belongs to the War & Geopolitics archive hub and the more specific Cuban Missile Crisis topic page. Use these hub pages when you want the broader collection context, linked subtopics, and more documents around the same archive thread.
pigs operation soviet control induce
Related subtopics
SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN CUBA
2 documents · 1184 known pages
Subtopic
1P Ee
1 documents · 3 known pages
Subtopic
Subtopic
Subtopic