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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962

354 pages · May 15, 2026 · Broad topic: War & Geopolitics · Topic: Cuban Missile Crisis · 354 pages OCR'd
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48. Cline, Memorandum for the Record, “ Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba," ‘otification of NSC 27 October 1962 27 October 1962 aticn of USC Officials of Intelligence on Missile evening of 25 October the President called er party I was attending at the azartcent of nault, widew of the late General, at L101 Cathedral aveme. ard stories that Cia officers were allegirg that intelli- nce on offensive aissile bases in Cvba had been available for several ys before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked ne to confirn that I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of Gntelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities, and to tell him the facts in the case. 2. I told the President that I was responsible in CIA for substan- tive analysis of intelligence and the dissenination of current intelligence to the President and the Hational Security Council. I said I could state categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure the mission with the first photography of the MRBM offensive bases wes flom on Lh October and it took approximately 2) hours for the film to be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpreta- tion Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or early evening of 15 October, that I myself heard of it first at that time, and that we completed the analysis oefore passing the information formally to the te Youse on tae morning of 16 October. The President seemed content with this explanation. 3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling of this sensitive information, I have tried to reconstruct what I know of the events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as follows. Under direct orders fra the President, given to me and General the White Souse several weeks earlier when the possibility that missile was a longer-range weaton, I had issued , to see that intelligence on new offensive nad identified the type of intelligence should an ernoca at the Methods Conference. efexse
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