◆ SpookStack

48. (Continued) When I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military intelligence analysts awaiting me. I do not know how long they had been waiting to see me but it could act have been many minutes or they would have passed a inessage to me at the Conference Room. They were all agreed that they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of 350 miles. I reviewed their evidence and was obliged to concur. 5. The DCI had gone to the west Coast and General Carter was then at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive Dining Room at the Headquarters building in liclean. I was the host but delayed my arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence. Upon arrival I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelli- gence. I said it would take several hours to wrap up a definitive report with fully considered analysis. General Carter said he was going to dinner with General Taylor and General Carroll (DIA) and would let them mow. I asked if he would notify Lir. McGeorge Bundy for the ‘white House and he said he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there. 6. About 2130 that evening my intelligence officers checking out the evidence on the site reported somenhat eryotically by phone that they had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in ‘the 700-mile and possibly in the 1,000-mile range. I instructed them to complete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning. 7. A few minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until morning to alert the key officers at the white House and State Department, swthey Should insure early attention to the problem on the next day. i assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS and DIA but that he might have missed the White House. accordingly I called ir. McGeorge Bundy, found he had not seen General Carter, and double-talked the information to him in broad terms. He was very clear as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security over the phone. This was about 2200. I then called Roger Hilsman of the State Department and conveyed the same information to hin. I had more difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant MRBM's rather than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated, but the light finally dammed and he (as he later informed me) called the Secretary of State to pass on the word. 8. karly the next morning, 16 October, at about 0830, I talked again on the phone to Mr. Bundy. (I forget whether he called me or vice versa) I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and cal- culated the ranges of possible missiles (by then we had settled on 700 to 1100 miles) and crudely indicated them on a map. At Mr. Bundy!s invitation I went immediately to his office, having cleared this with General Carter, who had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the White House formal notification. Sid Graybeal, my missiles expert from OSI, accompanied me. In Bundy's office I told him the story. He shortly