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54, McCone memorandum, 17 October 1962 October 17, 1962 Several alternatives indicated below were posed for con- sideration at the close of neeting covered by memorandum dated October ! 7th. Ali dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around: (a) Whether nilitary action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Xbrushchev and Castro. (b) Notification to or consultation with our allies, in- cluding NATO, OAS, and others. (c) Referral to the United Nations. (a) Effect on the "balance of nuclear power equation” of the MRBM installations in Cuba. Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each. (1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that tern Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned. (2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that "Intelligence Fer~—~."" indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. Ure. f have seen no euch estimate). 163