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ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962

354 pages · May 15, 2026 · Broad topic: War & Geopolitics · Topic: Cuban Missile Crisis · 354 pages OCR'd
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57. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m.,"" 19 October 1962 SEGRET October 19, 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m., attended by Rusk, Ball (each part of the time) Martin, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, McCone, Bohlen, Thompson, Bundy, Sorenson, Dean Acheson (for a short time). Note: Fhe 4:00 o'clock meeting adjourned at about 7:00, and re- assembled at 10:00 p.m., in Secretary Ball's conference room, adjourning at 11:45 p.m. pe 17 Coklen, Note: At 9:30 asm.,DCI went to see the President, then went to Gettysburg to see General Eisenhower. The purpose of the discussion was to develop a plan of action in connection with Cuba, and the alternatives are summarized in my memorandum of October 18th addressed to USIB, copy of which is attached, This memorandum will record views as they were expressed and developed throughout the meetings. Ambassador Bohlen warmed against any action against Cuba, particularly an air strike without warning, stating such would be @ivisive with all Allies and subject us to criticism throughout the world. He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro; if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action; advise our principal allies, seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act. The Attorney General and Bohlen exchanged views as to just what type of an answer we could expect from Khrushchev and what he might do if we threatened an attack. During this dis- cussion Secretary Rusk seemed to favor asking Congress for a declaration of a state of war against Cuba and then proceed with OAS, NATO, etc., but always preserve ‘lexibility as to the type of action. Bohlen consistently warned that world opinion would be against us if we carried out 2 military strike. Secretary Ball - emphasized the importance of time, stating that if action was over quickly, the repercussions would not be too serious 169
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