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57. (Continued There followed an extensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a military blockade, total or partial. It was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented th schedule of alternative military strikes, copy of which is attached, and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing meetings. Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows: We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations as they evolve. We should have no consultations with Khrushchev, Castro, or our allies, but should fully alert our allies in the most persuasive manner by high level people. This would include all NATO partners, and the OAS, The President should forget about the elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches. As an alternate to military action, a plan was discussed in- volving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade. Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade. General Taylor at this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in sudsequent meetings he seemed inclined towards a military strike. MeCone gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicatin; its seriousness would depend upon how “hard” a blockade it turned out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed with the missile problem. McCone stated that we must all bear in mind that we have two objectives, one, disposing of the missile sites, and the other, getting rid of Castro's communism in the Western Hemisphere. The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary Rusk came forward with the following plan. The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba. There is not much profit in preliminary exchanges with Khrushchev and Castro because the President has said that the establishment of