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111. (Continued) uitnin Cuba va e of the Centra did produc. valuakle reports deve thet t snee of more ef~ stine agent coverage, as intelligence collection operations, to the inability of our Go r date the danger of the Suviet % over the years there has been 2 ong-term plenning for the installation of the: We find also that full use was not mace of aer. nic surveillance, particularly during September and Octeber the influx of Soviet military personnel and a2 ents had major proportions, recognize that September ent weather delayed some of the scheduled U-2 missions. yer, we note September 8 to Sentember 16 U-2 mis~ eLons over cube s ed appa: y se oF the loss of } na mainland on September 8, We also note z th goneern that during the period of inereasin, emergency, as pointed up by intelligence indicators, there was not @ corresponding intens. ion of the scheduling of U-2 sions over the island. “ith regard to proposals for aerial photogrephic surveil- of Cuba, we make the following additional observations: (2) fhe President granted euthorization for all U-2 rate were recommended to him by his policy advisers ecial Group having responsibility for such matters, (ay The Special Group approved, in one instance with modifications, all U-2 overflights recommended to it. (We surmise that on its own the Spec al Group ¢ould nave initiated overflight recommendations.) * (3) Until October 3, when the Defense Intelligence Agency urged that suspicicus areas of Cuba be covered by U-2 photographic missions, it appears that there was a failure on the pert of the © tae eceon a ~S2e! ig] Group , The need for more eater nic surveillance during the omer and f was even more pressing in vie r the inadequacy of clandestine agent resources and the limited effeotiveness of g