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111. (Continued) rs that witt th have been given ¢ val Intelligence in © reconnaissance of en the sr Group took up the m r }wes taken th e Secretary of Defense d Suh he low- level oper: 2 coverage of the same area becem 2 2g sa vious appro- Sprlateness of the pr an eretary of Defense, we is layed there should for lov~leval vere flown over gence Anely: . We find the need for improvement of th? processes used in making national intelligence estimates ang the processes used in making current intelligence analyses, and also in the techniques ing these tvo functions, . ‘The President snd polic visozy of 3 were i11 served by the Speci National -Intelligenc? £st. ea by the intel- Ligence community on Sept 9, on "The y Buildup in be," timate conclu: that the estab: ment of Soviet ~ te range istic missiles in Cuba vould be stent with Soviet prac jate and with Soviet policy as the commumity then assess st. a nent, made .at the very time when the vi. 2 installing NRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba, we attribute to (1) the 1 of adequate intelligence 7 coverage of Cuba, (2) the rigor ew was held that the Eoviet Union would not assu ed in establishing nuclear strixing forces on Cut soil, and (3) the absence of an imaginative appraisal of the elligence indicators which, although’ Limited in number, were contain: in reports disseminated by our intelligence agencies. (; a this conclusion ev recognize the aysence at of any conzlus intelligence, ) n though we hotographic oe 2 Pp ted away from the likeli- hood of the ¢ et nuclear missile systems in - . .Cuba, An Important cautionary statement appaared in a discussion papagrapn, nemely, that the contingency of such a development ‘ully, even though it would mm counter to current Soviet policy, ‘This cautionary statesent, however, was not carried forward into the contlusions of the Estimate,