◆ SpookStack

TO 8S oO. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Certain basic conclusions have been drawn from this survey of the Cuban operation: 1. The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to build up the resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba, drastically converted the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability. @. The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation. 3. As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation. 4, The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat operations showed up poorly.