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W~ SECREI across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/ with WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti- Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, Prospects for the Castro Regime, was issued, belaboring the obvious -- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation about Castro's military forces: The militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part time training basis. .However, there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized, well equipped, and well trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced; we believe that within the next 12 months or so, these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force. 13/ The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness of the Air Force is virtually ,nil." 2./ . The concept for Project JMATE, however, had shifted from small unit guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of * President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960, "Senator Kennedy" came to the White House for a brief- ing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba, this being one of the first three items that Kennedy wished to talk about and that: "He [JFK] had previous- . ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and had some familiarity with the details." 12/ - 176 - TOP [JEER: ET -