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get a copy)~ and if he had been alert, he should have queried secretary Rusk on this issue.* It was on the question of the air operations, however, that secretary of State Rusk's testimony was at its protective best. Because of the criticality of this issue in the controversy over the responsibilities for failure of the invasion effort, it is believed that Rusk's testimony on this subject is worth quoting in full. It went as follows: Question: Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing? Secretary Rusk: Yes, it was understood that it was essential to the success of the landing, but there was an inadequate appreciation of the enemy's capability in the air. Furthermore, neither the Presi- dent nor I was clear that there was a D-2 air strike. We did have it on our minds that there would be a D-Day air strike. Following the D-2 air strike there was con- siderable confusion. It wasn't realized that there was to be more than one air strike in the Havana area. The President was called on this matter and he didn't think there should be second strikes in the area IHavana? or Cuba?] unless there were over- riding considerations. We talked about the relative importance of the air strikes with Mr. Bissell and General Cabell at the time. However, they indicated that the air strikes would be important but not critical. I offered to let them call the President but they indicated that they didn't think the matter was that important. They said that they preferred not to call the President. * Admiral Burke also would have received a copy of JCSM-l66-6l as a member of the JCS. Although the record shows Burke in attendance at the morning meeting of the Committee in the Pentagon, he was not recorded as an attendee at the afternoon session in Rusk's office. If Burke had been alert and reviewed his copy of the Rusk testimony, he could have clarified the JCS position to the committee. 98 .~