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the DOD representatives, General Gray and Captain Scapa, had questions it was his assumption that they would have asked.* One final note with reference to the DCI's testimony is that when he was questioned about his absence from the continental United States at the time the invasion was taking place, he admitted that this was "probably unwise." He went on to explain how he had planned for over a year to be in Puerto Rico to address the Young Executives group. He was the main attraction for the group and, "If I had dropped out at the last moment, unless I had gone to bed or a hospital, or feigned some illness, it would have been noted very clearly and would have been related to what was about to happen." Dulles said that he had told various and sundry people at the White House and the Agency that he * The visits by the Joint Staff officers to training sites to evaluate the anti-Castro infantry and air force and the numbers of DOD personnel who might be permitted to attend certain CIA briefings were closely controlled. There is no question that it seemed that senior project officers involved in the anti-Castro effort did tend at times to hold DOD per- sonnel at arms length. It should be kept in mind, however, that many of these restrictions also applied to other CIA personnel, even some affiliated with the project. For the most part restrictions on access to information were for the purpose of protecting the security of the operation rather than for any ulterior motives. Mr. Dulles's sniping at the DOD was somewhat similar to the criticisms he had made during his briefing of the CIA Subcom- mittee of the House Armed Services Committee on 27 April 1961. At that time the DCI indicated that the JCS representatives had reservations about the anti-Castro plan and he implied that any flaws in the military aspects of the operation should be blamed on the ,,'military specialists" who:~~ere assigned to CIA as advisors. ---