◆ SpookStack

wished that he had known before the operation was launched how strong Kennedy's reservations about the plan were sug- gests that the DCI missed some obvious signals from the President in the delays, questions, and, most importantly, the decision that led to the switch from Trinidad to the Bahia de Cochinos well prior to the cancellation of the D- 157/* Day strike. In addition to·the record of 21 meetings and one dated "Conversation," the package of material identified by NARS as Part II of the Taylor Committee Report also includes memo- I randums of two additionai "Conversations," both undated. One of these conversations was with David A. Phillips, Chief, Propaganda Section for the anti-Castro project; and the other conversation was with Colonel Jack Hawkins who was in charqe of planning the paramilitary effort. Why these two conversations were undated cannot be determined. The undated record of the conversations held with David A. Pbillips was made in response to a request, apparently from General Taylor, that Phillips's comment on two paragraphs which "we intended to include in our report on _propaganda. " There is no indication ·that any members of the CSG except General Taylor were in attendance during the meeting and, as usual Col. Tarwater kept the record. * See footnote on following page. 166'-- .OJ