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alternatives designed to involve the OAS, the UN, or individual Latin American nations in making clear to Castro that they found the. growing Soviet presence in Cuba a threat to political and economic stability of the area. With the 20/20 vision of hindsight, it is unfortunate that Mann's proposals were dismissed in lieu of an additional six to eight weeks' delay to seek either Latin American support, a u.s. commitment to winning, or cancella- tion of the project. Mr. McNamara then got involved in the question of whether there was a guerrilla option that was open to the invading brigade. After some confusing testimony on this sUbject, the following exchange occurred: Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising? Secretary McNamara: They would be split up into a guerrilla force and moved into the Escambrays. 78/ Once again none of the committee members questioned whether the br~gade actually had been trained to conduct such a sophisticated military maneuver in the face of a hostile force or whether a breako~t ~rom Playa Giron for the Escambray through at least 50 miles of opposition was realistic. Next Mr. McNamara was requested to give his opinions about the JCS evaluation of the Zapata plan and also about the importance of controlling the air over Cuba. Recalling that JCSM-166-61 of 83