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why on D-Day did not he or the Chiefs go immediately to President Kennedy with a recommendation that the target system be reinstated? Certainly this would have been in keeping with the cables that were coming in from the Chief of Air Operations in Puerto Cabezas regarding the need for strikes against 'Castro's airfields. When asked by the committee if control of the air was essential to the success of the invasion, Secretary McNamara responded: It was understood that without control of the air the chances of success would be considerably decreased. The under- standing of Castro's Air Force was not adequate, particularly in terms of the numbers and types of aircraft. Further- more, it was assumed that a larger number of aircraft would be incapacitated. This appears to have been a major error. However, to get back to the question of control of the air, it was certainly understood that it was very important. It doesn't appear that we would have achieved complete control of the air even if we had made the dawn air attack. '81/ This response contained so many errors that one might even speculate that pe~haps the Secretary of Defense had an ulterior motive in mind, Control of the air had been emphasized, re- emphasized, stated, and restated, as the essential to success of the operation. It was not a question of whether the chances for success would be decreased, it was a question of success or failure--there was no middle ground. Even Mr. Bundy, as noted earlier, had made control of the air the sine qua non for victory. Moreover, the Agency fully and 85 ,Ii