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judinary, in CI cases these authorities have only moderate authonty. For example, the FISA requires that FISA matters be hardied exclusiy through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court located m Washington, D.C. “4 ‘The FBI's ability to respond appropriately to an adversary that is very different from a traditional criminal defendant. For exampie, in CI matters the adversary may be a foreign uitelagence service that has a centrally controlled bureaucracy with a sirategy, plans, and budget, or it may be an intelligence service that operates asymmetncally fom amorphous collection platforms as well as through more traditional symmetrical means. Defeating and disrupting an organization hke the latter requires a compretiensive strategy and programa plan Success would likely not result from a piece-meal approach, bat would be possible based on an approach that incorporates robust centrally dnven strategic analysis as well as Jocal tactical analysis. With respect specifically to mdividual case management, the Office of Origin concept remains in place for CT mvestigations. The FBI has traditionally allowed SACs great latitude m all facets of investigative strategy and categories, and SACs and their Seld agents still exercise overall operational and day-to-day contra! of the vast majority of individual cases. As indicated above, increased FBY oversight and centralization of individual cases is somewhat more frequent now than in the past because more FBI investigative assets are focused on CT and these cases more frequently mvolve multiple FBI Divisions and multipie agencies. Because individual offices may have a narrower view of the FBI’s overall CT program and a limited ability to interface daily with the multitude of foreign and domestic orgamzations often involved in CT investigations, increased centrahzation allows FBIHQ to set, monttor, and adjust natona! pnonties and te coordinate information analysis and intelligence sharing In rare situations, FBIHQ exercises operational control of an investigation counter to the desires of an SAC. In most cases this is because the overall strategic objective is different from the field division's objective. Operational as this are normally discussed at length before mnplementation. 2. How, if at all, has this centralization initiative shifted the relative balance of power between FB] Headquarters and Field Special Agents in-Charge? 43 MISC. REQ. #53 000004715